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Abstract: How to make a reasonable decision in a pluralistic community when two of their highest values (CP
and CN) are incommensurable, one of them (CP) is used as a premise in favor of a proposal (C), and the other
one (CN) is used as a premise against the very same proposal? After considering previous answers to similar
questions, I suggest establishing new hierarchies of values from the point of view of their conditions of
possibility.
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Introduction
Practical argumentation is argumentation about what to do in order to solve a practical
problem. In this kind of argumentation people try to decide between two or more proposals.
Arguments about proposals may be composed of values, rules, purposes, considerations of
unintended consequences, and means. Among these elements, values seem to be very
important. From their point of view, people establish what kind of situations are practical
problems, what types of means are allowed, what kind of consequences are acceptable, and
what might be a purpose.
In pluralistic communities, the way in which values affect the other elements of
practical argumentation can lead to problems to choose a proposal rationally. Indeed, when
there are two or more values which are not subordinated to other values and have the same
level of importance, it may happen that two incompatible proposals are justified, each from
the point of view of a different value. How can a reasonable choice be made in this situation?
What role can appeal to facts and factual evidence play in this situation? These are the
questions that I shall develop in this paper.
To do this, I proceed as follows: (1) at first, I characterize the situations to which I
refer; (2) in a second moment, I expose some previous answers to similar questions to the
ones I am interested in this paper; (3) After this, I suggest a way to answer my main
questions; (4) Finally, I highlight some conclusions.
(1) The problem of the values incommensurability in conductive arguments
In the discussions to which I refer, arguers appeal to values of their community to which the
other values of that same community are subordinated. Hereafter, I will refer to these values
as values of the highest level of importance. In the discussions which I refer, these highest
values:
(1.1) become incompatible with each other;
(1.2) belong to different and incommensurable dimensions of the practical problem to
be solved;
1
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(1.3) constitute arguments in favor of incompatible proposals belonging to different and
incommensurable dimensions of a practical problem.
(1.1) Values can be understood as criteria to guide actions. Characteristically, a community
has no contradictory values, but different values. Peace and justice, for example, are not
contradictory values but different values. Usually you do not have to choose between peace
and justice, but you want to satisfy both values at the same time. However, in a given
situation, it may be necessary to choose between these values. As Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca point out “incompatibility is always relative to contingent circumstances” (1971, p.
197). A situation may be such that two incompatible proposals are justified, one based on the
value of peace and the other based on the value of justice. This is a feature of the discussions
I am referring to: They are discussions in which people argue from the point of view of
different values which become incompatible in a given situation.
(1.2) Values can belong to the same dimension of a problem or to different dimensions
of the same problem. For example, the decrease in political violence and the monopoly of
violence by the State are two values that belong to the same dimension: Violence. On the
other hand, the decrease in political violence and the submission of the violent ones to the
judges are values belonging to different dimensions: to violence and legal order.
When two values belong to different dimensions of the same problem, they may be
commensurable or incommensurable. They are commensurable if there is a third value in
terms of which it is possible to think about the two values belonging to different dimensions.
They are incommensurable if this is not the case (Kock, 2017, pp. 106-126). For example, if,
for a community, situations characterized by political violence and lack of legal order were
practical problems only for economic reasons, then, for that community, violence and legal
order would be commensurable values in economic terms. Indeed, if that community had to
choose between negotiating with the violent ones and trying to bring them before the judges,
its members could ask what is less expensive economically. By contrast, if, for a community,
political violence is a practical problem because of the loss of human life, and lack of legal
order is a practical problem because people need to know what is allowed and what is not,
then, for that community, political violence and legal order are not commensurable. For such
a community there is not a third value in terms of which a choice can be justified. This is
another feature of the discussions I am referring to: They are discussions in which people
argue from the point of view of incommensurable values in a given community.
(1.3) By virtue of the above, continuing with the previous example, a position in the
type of discussions to which I refer can be presented as follows: "Although a negotiation
would reduce political violence, we should not negotiate because we would compromise
justice." An argument presented in this way can be classified as a conductive argument.
Carl Wellman coined the expression "conductive argument" to name a type of arguments he
defined “as that sort of reasoning in which 1) a conclusion about some individual case 2) is
drawn nonconclusively 3) from one or more premises about the same case 4) without any
appeal to other cases” (1971, p. 52). In addition to this definition, Wellman offered three
patterns for conductive arguments. However, after Govier (1999, pp. 155-183), the third
pattern has obtained greater attention. This pattern is “that form of argument in which some
conclusion is drawn from both positive and negative considerations” (1971, p. 57). A
negative consideration is a reason against the conclusion (Wellman, 1971, p. 57). In saying
that in a conductive argument a conclusion is drawn not only from positive considerations but
also from negative considerations, Wellman is using a concept of premise according to which
“A premise is any consideration (that is, anything that can be considered or attended to)
which counts or is thought to count for or against the conclusion” (1971, p. 90).
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As Jin (2011) has shown, this usage of the concept of premise differs from the
prevailing usage. According to the prevailing usage, only positive considerations,
considerations in favor of a conclusion, may count as premises of the arguer’s conclusion. I
will follow this prevailing usage. I accept that negative considerations are either objections to
the arguer’s conclusion (Johnson, 2011) or premises in favor of an alternative proposal
(Fairclough, 2019).
The most distinctive feature of conductive arguments is the presence of negative
considerations. From the point of view of these negative considerations, we can make some
general distinctions between conductive arguments (Figure 1):
Figure 1:
Negative considerations in conductive arguments

Recognition
Moment

Negative considerations

Speech act

Strong (A)
Weak (B)
Before (A)
After (B)
Premise (A)
Objection (B)

I. In a first place, we can make a distinction regarding how strong the recognition of the
negative considerations is. In this sense, there is a difference between strong and weak
negative considerations. (A) Strong negative considerations are considerations recognized by
the arguer as premises of arguments against their proposal, either in favor of the proposed
action not to be carried out or in favor of the performance of an action incompatible with the
proposal. (B) Weak negative considerations are considerations perceived by the arguer as
objections which may be or has already been overridden by arguments in favor of their
proposal (Govier, 1999, pp. 155-156).
II. In a second place, we can make a distinction regarding to the moment of the
argumentation in which the negative consideration is presented. A negative consideration
may be presented either before or after the arguer has displayed all of their arguments. (A) In
the first moment a negative consideration may be presented as a strong premise in favor of a
proposal which is incompatible with the arguer’s proposal and, because of that, as a
consideration that must be taken into account. (B) In the last moment it may be presented as a
weak consideration against the proposal, as a consideration which has already been
outweighed (Fairclough, 2019).
III. In a third place, we can make a distinction regarding to the kind of speech act
performed by the arguer in presenting a negative consideration. In this sense, we can make a
distinction between negative considerations performed as premises and negative
considerations performed as objections. (A) A negative consideration is performed as a
premise when the arguer thinks it could be a reason in favor of an alternative proposal -even
when that alternative proposal is not to do something which has been put forward
(Fairclough, 2019). Alternatively, (B) a negative consideration is performed as an objection
when the arguer thinks it is something that needs to be clarified for a given proposal to be
acceptable (Johnson, 2011).
Now, we can ask our main questions again. In cases in which we have
multidimensionality and incommensurability between the highest values, how can we go
reasonably from instances of the possibility (A) to instances of the possibility (B)? how can
we make a reasonable decision? what role can appeal to facts and factual evidence play in
this situation?
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2. Previous answers to similar problems
In this numeral I expose solutions to problems very similar to the one I have raised in the
previous paragraph. I think that considering these problems and differentiating them with the
problem I am concerned with in this article, contributes to a better understanding of the
peculiarity of the latter.
According to Wellman, we make decisions through conductive arguments by thinking
about positive and negative considerations repeatedly, until we come to a decision. Wellman
thinks that this process is similar to the way in which someone heft objects with their hands
in order to find out which one is heavier (1971, p. 57). Such a description does not
correspond to a reasonable process. How do we decide through conductive arguments, when
we do it reasonably? How do we stablish which of two considerations, a positive and another
negative, is stronger?
(2.1) Exceptions
(2.1.1) According to Govier
What helps us to evaluate the strength of reasons is that reasons must have a degree of
generality. If x is a reason for y, then all that is relevantly similar to x is a reason for all that is
relevantly similar to y. The task is only (sic) to clarify what is and what is not relevantly
similar to x and y. If being x is a reason for case (a) being y, then, other things being equal
(the relevant similarities being assumed) all cases that are x are y. But what are these other
things? What are the relevant similarities?
If P1, P2 and P3 are put forward as reasons for C, then the conductive argument that
"Because Pl, P2, and P3, C" assumes that:

1.
2.
3.

Other things being equal, insofar as P1 is true, C.
Other things being equal, insofar as P2 is true, C.
Other things being equal, insofar as P3 is true, C.

Reasons for C, in this sense, establish a presumption in favor of C. To say that P1 is a reason
for C is to say that, other things being equal, if P1 then C. (Govier, 1999, p. 171)

The generality to which we appeal by means of the “other things being equal” expression is
important because, from Govier’s point of view, the strength of a consideration depends on
the range of exceptions associated to such a generality:
on reflect on how strong a reason is in the case or context we are considering, we
have to reflect on how many other things would have to be "equal" and whether they
are so in this case. A strong reason is one where the range of exceptions is narrow. A
weak reason is one where the range of exceptions is large. (1999, p. 171)
As I understand it, in the above quotation, Govier is suggesting that in a conductive
argument, which follows the third pattern:
1.
2.

There are two considerations, (1) and (2).
(1) could be a consideration in favor of a conclusion (3), and (2) could be a
consideration against the same conclusion (3).
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3.

4.

One of those considerations constitutes an exception with respect to a rule expressed
by the other consideration. For example, (1) asserts the exceptional character of a
given situation with respect to a rule expressed by (2).
And, because of that, the conclusion for which the exception is relevant is drawn. For
example, the conclusion (3) is drawn because (1) is accepted, so, (2) is not a rule
applicable to the situation.

For the purposes of this presentation, it could be useful to make a distinction between cases in
which a rule and its exception belongs to the same dimension, and cases in which a rule and
its exception belongs to different dimensions. As an example, let us examine a case that
Zenker (2011) has set out and its correspondent comment:
Here, (CC) stands for counter-consideration, (PR) for pro-reason and (OBP) for onbalance premise; order and numbering are presumed to be arbitrary.
Example of a Conductive Argument
(CC1) Aircraft travel leaves a large environmental footprint.
(CC2) Aircraft travel is physically exhausting.
(CC3) Aircraft travel is comparatively expensive.
(CC4) Airports do not always route baggage correctly.
(PR1) Aircraft travel is comparatively fast.
(PR2) I am overworked and likely able to sleep on the plane.
(PR3) My department reimburses travel expenses.
(PR4) Environmental footprint-differences can be compensated by purchase.
(OBP) PR1-PR4 outweigh/are on balance more important than (CC1-4)
(C)It is apt to travel to the conference by aircraft (rather than by train).
In this example, (PR2-PR4) counter (CC1-CC3), while (PR1 Is not addressed by a
counter-consideration (”is open”). It is difficult to discern how (PR1) could be
addressed, other than by cancelling the above presupposition, in which case (PR1)
would be rendered irrelevant. Moreover, (CC4) remains unaddressed by any proreason. (Zenker, 2011, p. 80)
As we can read in this quotation, in this example there are three pro-reasons or positive
considerations countered by three counter-considerations or negative considerations. Then,
we can distinguish three pairs of positive and negative considerations. Now, if we try to
understand the relationship between the members of each pair, I think we can find out that, in
this example, the positive considerations affirm the exceptional nature of the arguer's
situation with respect to the rule associated with negative consideration. That is why they can
be true or acceptable at the same time, in this example. Indeed, we can reformulate the three
pairs of considerations adding an exception clause, as follows:
(CC2) Aircraft travel is physically exhausting, (E)unless the traveler can sleep
(PR2) I am overworked and likely able to sleep on the plane.
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(CC1) people who travel by plane leave a larger environmental footprint than people
who travel by train.
(E)(PR4) unless the traveler compensates the footprint-difference by purchase.
(CC3) Aircraft travel is comparatively expensive for the traveler.
(E)unless someone reimburses the traveler for traveler expenses.
(PR3) My department reimburses travel expenses.
In cases like these, negative and positive considerations must belong to a same dimension.
For example, in the three previous pairs of considerations, the first pair belongs to physical
strength; the second to environmental damage; and the third one to money. In contrast, (PR1)
and (CC4) do not belong to a same dimension: (PR1) concerns to speed and (CC4) concerns
to baggage.
Also, some of the examples Govier presents are examples in which positive and
negative considerations belong to different dimensions:
1) The apartment has two bedrooms, which is what we require. Furthermore, (2) the
area is quiet, (3) there is good public transportation, and (4) the rent is not too high.
Despite the fact that (5) it needs painting and even admitting that (6) the previous
tenant has left the kitchen in bad repair, (7) it’s the place we should take. (Govier,
2010, p. 356)
“That it will save money is often a good reason for adopting a social policy- but not if
many lives are likely to be lost under the policy.” (Govier, 1999, p. 171)
In both two cases, we can reformulate the reasonings in such a way that becomes explicit the
exception clauses. However, for the sake of brevity, I will consider the first one: That the
apartment(5) needs painting and that(6) the previous tenant has left the kitchen in bad repair,
are reasons for (8) not to take the place; (E) unless the apartment has enough rooms, the area
is quiet, there is good public transportation, and the rent is not too high. Now, (1) The
apartment has two bedrooms, which is what we require, (2) The area is quiet, (3) there is
good public transportation, and (4) the rent is not too high. So, (7) this apartment is the place
we should take.
In cases like these, in which the rule and the exception do not belong to the same
dimension, we are able to draw conclusions because we have previously stablished value
hierarchies. That is, because we value more space, quiet, and rent price than painting and the
fact that an apartment is not in good condition; or because we value more human lives than
money. Indeed, what may be a reason for doubt in the relationship between (PR1) and (CC4),
in Zenker’s example, is the possibility of someone assigning the same value to arrive with
their luggage as to arrive quickly.
In cases in which (a) the rule and the exception do not belong to a same dimension, and
(b) a value hierarchy is not assumed, it is necessary to stablish such a hierarchy in order for
the positive considerations lead to a conclusion. Indeed, otherwise, negative considerations
would prevent us from reasonably drawing a conclusion in light of positive considerations. A
premise in which a hierarchy is established in order for a conclusion being drawn, despite the
negative considerations, is a kind of premise that Hansen has labeled as “on-balance
premises.” That is, premises in which it is observed that “one set of considerations outweighs
a second set” (Hansen, 2011, p. 39). Now, how can we reasonably justify an on-balance
premise in which a hierarchy of values is established? I will go back to this point in the third
numeral of this presentation.
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(2.1.2) Fischer
Until this point, we have been taking exceptions to be items on a list of situations in which a
universal statement does not apply. However, according to Fischer, in this context, “the
quantity of exceptions concerns not the number of items on a list of exception categories,
which can be almost arbitrarily long. Rather, the quantity of exceptions must involve cases”
(2011, p. 91). Cases are actual or possible situations, judged within the framework of a
tradition, in which many other cases have been tried. In a tradition there are series of cases
that make up patterns. Thus, it is possible to argue by analogy from a pattern in favor of a
conclusion (Fischer, 2011, p. 95). As far as conductive arguments are concerned, it is
possible because in a case pattern we can find what factors or what dimensions and values
haven been privileged over others in previous cases.
In this way, the arguments by analogy from a case pattern can reasonably justify the onbalance premises when there is only one case pattern in the framework. Nonetheless, there
are different ways in which an arguer can find more than one case pattern from which
proceed by analogy. It may happen that
(1)

(2)

(3)

The arguer lives in a community whose history has different decision patterns
– perhaps because two or more groups with ideological differences have had
the power to make decisions alternately.
The arguer lives in a community in which it is acceptable to appeal to case
patterns of different communities. In such a community, different arguers can
appeal to different communities and, of course, to different case patterns.
The arguer lives in a community in which it is allowed to appeal to fictional
case patterns and, thus, possibly to different case patterns.

In those kinds of communities, for an arguer to justify an on-balance premise by means of an
analogy from a case pattern, it is necessary to justify the selection of the case pattern.
However, what kind of argument would be appropriate for this purpose? I shall come back to
this question in section 3.
(2.2) Preferences
Pinto (2011) remind us Wellman’s idea according to which “Wherever some descriptive
predicate is ascribed on the basis of a family resemblance conductive reasoning takes place”
(Wellman, 1971, p. 54). Pinto thinks that:
descriptive predicates fitting this description exhibit open texture […]
the three characteristics Wellman ascribes to predicates exhibiting open texture, namely:
1. there are several criteria for the application of the term
2. the criteria can be satisfied to a greater or lesser degree
3. the criteria may vary in importance
also apply, I think, to the “good-making” or “right-making characteristics on which
we base our ethical or moral appraisals […]
what gives rise to the need to assess relative strength (in the sense of weight) of pro
and con considerations in conductive arguments is rooted in the fact that the
conclusions of such arguments involve the application of predicates (normative and/or
descriptive) whose applications are based on criteria or “features” exhibiting these
three characteristics. (Pinto, 2011, pp. 119-120)
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Based on this, Pinto suggests that:
(a) What enables us to compare the relative force of a single pro and a single con
consideration is our ability (i) to estimate the degree to which those features are
present in the situation with which those considerations are concerned, (ii) to
determine our preferences with respect to the features on which those considerations
turn, and (iii) to estimate the degree of risk we undertake in relying each of those
considerations and
(b) our comparisons of relative force based on these preferences and estimates will be
reasonable if and only if both the preferences and the two sorts of estimates on which
such comparisons depend are reasonable -i.e., are preferences and estimates for which
we have good reasons all things considered. (Pinto, 2011, p. 124)
Pinto’s suggestion is applicable to descriptive and normative predicates. Practical arguments
in political deliberation may contain descriptive and normative predicates. The former may
be used for making descriptions of actions whose performance would modify a problematic
situation and would produce a new situation in accordance with the values and purposes of
the agent. The latter may be used, for example, for expressing values or norms. There is an
entanglement of normative and descriptive components in the description of practical
problems because such a kind of description is always performed from the point of view of
both facts and values. Therefore, Pinto’s suggestion is applicable to arguments adduced to
justify a premise of a practical argument, in cases in which those premises are conclusions of
conductive arguments.
However, Pinto’s suggestion is not applicable to the conclusions of practical arguments in
political deliberation because predicates in this kind of conclusions are not used for making
descriptions or appraisals. Predicates in the conclusions of practical arguments in the context
of political deliberations are used for making decisions or declarations (Fairclough &
Fairclough, 2013, pp. 35-36; Gómez, 2017; Kock, 2017, pp. 106-126). A description or an
appraisal may be the conclusion of a discussion in which acceptable reasons in favor and
against a conclusion are considered when, as Pinto has said, the application of the predicate is
based on criteria fitting the three characteristics of open texture concepts. In contrast, a
decision or a declaration may be the conclusion of a conductive argumentation when:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

There is a situation perceived as a practical problem
Such situation is a practical problem because it is incoherent with the agent’s
values and purposes
The proposals put forward in order to solve the practical problem satisfy some of
the values but do not satisfy all of them
The agent has to make a decision
There is not a proposal satisfying all the values

Therefore, for assessing the force or weigh of the negative and positive considerations, and
for drawing a conclusion in the context of political deliberations, in situations in which the
highest values become incompatible, belong the different dimensions and cannot be
commensurate, we need a procedure for assessing values. How could we do that?
(2.3) Classifications
Macagno and Walton (2018) state the problem and their suggestion as follows:
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The crucial problem is how to account for, describe, and evaluate arguments that are
grounded on distinct and often incompatible values (or evaluative dimensions) (Kock
2003, 158). The challenge is to overcome value incommensurability, namely the
impossibility of ‘‘ranking with respect to a common denominator of value’’ the
conflicting values on which the arguments are based (Kock 2007a, 236). The solution
envisaged is focused on the classification of states of affairs. While values can be
incommensurable at an abstract level, they can be compared and ranked when applied to
specific phenomena, leading to individual preferences (Kock 2007a, 237) that can be
discussed. In this sense, deliberative argumentation should be focused on the
acknowledgment, comparison, analysis, and discussion (Olmos 2016, 15) of the
interpretation and the description of the states of affairs used to argue in favor or against a
proposal (Kock 2003, 170; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 32). (Macagno & Walton,
2018, p. 524)
This proposal supposes a conception of practical reasoning in which they distinguish three
“groups of argumentation schemes representing distinct reasons for different types of (final or
intermediate) conclusions” (Macagno & Walton, 2018, p. 538). These schemes combine with
each other to represent the structure of practical argumentation. They “associate the three
groups of schemes to three interrelated levels of analysis, ranging from the less complex but
also less specific and fine-grained level to the deepest one” (2018, p. 538). They describe
each of the levels as follows:
1. Level 1 The first and simplest level of analysis is constituted by the justification of an
action, which includes the schemes from practical reasoning, from consequences, and
from rules. At this level, only the relationship between an evaluation (or
classification) and the choice of an action is taken into account. …
2. Level 2 At this level, the evaluation of the distinct alternatives (in case of practical
reasoning) and the consequences of an action are represented. …
3. Level 3 This level is the deepest level of analysis and represents the classificatory
reasoning presupposed by evaluation. A state of affairs needs to be classified in a
certain fashion in order to become a premise in an argument from rules, from
consequences, or from values. (Macagno & Walton, 2018, p. 538)
As I understand it, this proposal is that arguments by classification may be employed for
justifying the premise in which the problematic situation is described in the arguments from
values (in the premise 2), or in the arguments from the consequences to evaluation (in the
premise 1), or in the arguments from the rules (in the minor premise). Macagno and Walton
exemplify their proposal through a discussion that they represent as follows:
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Image 1:
A modular reconstruction of Putin’s practical argument (Macagno & Walton, 2018, p. 540)
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Image 2
A modular reconstruction of Obama’s reply to Putin’s argument (Macagno & Walton, 2018,
p. 541)

As we can read in the example, there are two proposals: Putin’s proposal and Obama’s
proposal. In Putin’s practical argument, there is an argument from values: (Premise 1)
“Stability is desirable (more desirable than protection to human rights),” and (Premise 2)
“Mr. Assad is a force for stability.” At the same time, this last premise is justified by an
argument from classification: (Premise 1) “Keeping oppositions and terrorism under control
means avoiding changes. Stability is resistance to change,” and (Premise 2) “Mr. Assad keeps
terrorists and oppositions under control.” On the other hand, in Obama’s practical argument,
there are two arguments from values. For the sake of brevity, let us pay attention only to one
of them: (Premise 1) “Who contributes to the current strifes and instability is bad and not
desirable,” and (Premise 2) “Assad contributed to instability and terrorism”. In relation with
the Premise 1 of this argument there is a premise “Justice and permanent stability are more
desirable than keeping terrorism under control.” Also, as in Putin’s argument, the premise 2
of the argument from values is justified by an argument from classification: (Premise 1)
“Creating the environment for strifes and terrorism means contributing to instability and
terrorism,” and (Premise 2) “Assad’s killing created the environment for the current strife,
which the Islamic State has been able to exploit.”
Now, why should anyone reasonably accept one of the arguer’s conclusion, instead of
the alternative conclusion? Anyone who accepts the information parenthetically introduced in
the premise 1 of Putin’s argument from values (stability is more desirable than protection to
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human rights), will accept Putin’s conclusion; but, by the same reason, anyone who accepts
the premise introduced with relation to the premise 1 of Obama’s argument from values
(justice and permanent stability are more desirable than keeping terrorism under control), will
accept Obama’s conclusion.
Neither the information parenthetically introduced in the premise 1 of Putin’s
argument from values (stability is more desirable than protection to human rights) nor the
premise introduced with relation to the premise 1 of Obama’s argument from values (justice
and permanent stability are more desirable than keeping terrorism under control) has been
labeled as on-balance premises in the example. However, I think they play the role of onbalance premises: In them a value is presented as outweighing other value.
From this we can learn that, in the kind of argumentation in which I am interested to,
the need for the on-balance premises cannot be obliterated. As Hans Hansen has pointed out,
a conductive argument is an argument “that goes from the observation that one set of
considerations outweighs a second set -the counter-considerations- to the conclusion that
some claim is reasonable even though the counter-considerations are true, or acceptable”
(Hansen, 2011, p. 39). Thus, in this kind of argumentation, outweighing considerations means
determining if the pro considerations are more important than the con considerations or vice
versa. Now, when conductive argumentation takes place as a deliberation about what to do in
a situation in which the highest values became incompatible, outweighing means stablishing
a new hierarchy of values. That is what, in those cases, should be expressed by the onbalance premise. Nevertheless, how can we do that without going against the pluralistic
assumption, that there are several values at the same highest level? And, what kind of
argument may be reasonably employed in order to justify such a new hierarchy of values?
(2.4) Consequences.
According to Fairclough (2019), negative considerations are stronger than positive
considerations when the acceptance of the arguer’s proposal has unacceptable consequences.
When the consequences are acceptable and the proposal may achieve the intended goal,
positive considerations are stronger than negative considerations:
assuming that (based on all current knowledge) the proposal will achieve the goal (its
intended consequence), its unintended consequences or side effects may still
conclusively refute it, in case they are unacceptable and thus ought to be avoided. The
proposal will withstand criticism, and emerge as a potentially reasonable course of
action, if no unacceptable (intended or unintended) consequences have come to light
while considering whether to adopt A or not. The form of argumentation involved when
the conjecture that A is the right thing to do is refuted by its potential unacceptable
consequences is therefore deductively valid—modus tollens:
Action A will lead to consequence C.
Non-C should be the case.
Therefore, non-A should be the case. (Fairclough, 2019, p. 224)
Thus, everything depends on what counts as an unacceptable consequence:
“Consequences” include known impacts, but also risks (which may not materialize). In
addition, the situation where a proposal would clash with, or go against a moral or
institutional principle, rule or norm, would also be an unacceptable consequence, on my
account, should those principles, rules and norms be assessed (either singly or
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collectively) as ultimately non-overridable in a particular deliberative context.
(Fairclough, 2019, pp. 224-225)
If this is so, Fairclough’s suggestion is applicable to cases in which a practical problem may
be solved in accordance with all the highest values of a community. Cases in which people
have to make a choice between desirable achievements and institutional principles or values.
However, when, as in the cases I am referring to, a community must make a decision with
respect to which its highest values become incompatible, whatever decision they make will
clash against an institutional principle or value. In those cases, whatever decision would be
unacceptable from the point of view of some of the highest principle or value. For example,
when a community has to make a choice between negotiating a civil war and sacrifice justice
or maintaining war and sacrifice human lives, if such community has justice and life as some
of its highest values, that community will have to make a choice between two normally
unacceptable proposals. How can we reasonably justify a decision in such a situation? What
kind of argument may be employed whit that purpose?
(3) Value’s conditions of possibility
I think the values incommensurability problem can be solved if and only if it is possible for
an agent to justify a new value’s hierarchy. Indeed, the problem arise when the highest values
become incompatible in a given situation, there is not a third value in terms of which the
incompatible values can be commensurate, and all the proposals are such that their
acceptance would be incoherent with one of the highest values. The problem cannot be
solved without subordinate a value to the other one. This new value hierarchy can be
reasonably stablished if and only if there is a reasonable argument in favor of it. However,
there are two difficulties: (1) It seems that establishing a new hierarchy is not coherent with
the pluralistic assumption according to which there are several values in the highest level. (2)
It is not clear if, given the contingent nature of values, it is possible to argue reasonably about
them.
Starting with the last problem, it may be useful to have into account that although
values are contingent in nature, they have factual presuppositions. This can be known from
the fact that revisions of factual assumptions can make people revise value judgements, as
Putnam has shown in his reading of Sen (Putnam, 2002, pp. 75-76; Sen, 1967, pp. 50-51).
Thus, to use Connolly’s example, people who value democracy could probably change this
value if they became convinced that democratic discussions in our current situations leads to
the division of political parties into uncompromising warring bands (Connolly, 1993, p. 31).
Values are criteria to guide actions, they serve to select the kind of situations that
should be pursued. Values may or may not be executed. But, then, in order for a value to be
executed some things have to be obtained. Values have conditions of possibility. These
conditions of possibility may be used for thinking about them, for making comparisons
between them, and ultimately, for establishing hierarchies. We can think about what a value
is for a given community looking at the set of things that must be obtained in that community
for that value to be executed. We can make comparisons between values looking at the
differences and similarities between their sets of conditions of possibilities. Ultimately, we
can establish hierarchies between values from the point of view of their conditions of
possibility by determining between two values which value is a condition of possibility of the
other one.
In doing so, we do not go against the pluralistic assumption, that there are several
values in the highest level. Establishing a hierarchy of values from their conditions of
possibility is not necessarily establishing different levels of importance between values. On
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the contrary, it is establishing different places in an agenda (a list of things an agent has the
purpose to do) in which, although all of the values have the same level of importance, some
of them have to be executed for the others to be possible. Thus, a value J and a value P can
have the same level of importance and, nevertheless, a situation may be such that the
realization of J is a condition for the possibility of the realization of P, and not vice versa. It
does not have to be understood as if one value has more importance than the other one. It is
just that, although J and P have the same level of importance, J is a condition of possibility of
P. In such an arrangement, if someone wants to execute both values, in its agenda they have
to subordinate P to J.
For the same reason, in such an arrangement, if, in a given situation, someone cannot
execute both values at the same time but wants to maintain their order of values, they should
subordinate P to J because in doing that they preserve the possibility of realizing J after
realizing P, and because otherwise they could be losing the possibility of realizing J by
realizing P.
In this paper, I am not going to try to exhaustively determine a set of criteria for
establishing hierarchies between values of the same level of importance, from the point of
view of their conditions of possibility. However, to use a classical set of those criteria we
could recast some of the criteria Aristotle expose in his Rhetoric2:
And [what precedes is the greater] when one thing follows from another but the
relationship is not reciprocal (using follows in the sense of resulting simultaneously or
successively or potentially); for the use of what follows is already inherent in what
precedes (Aristotle, n.d., 1363b)
And something whose opposite is greater and whose loss is greater [is greater]
(Aristotle, n.d., 1364a)
And things that last a longer time rather than those that last a shorter time (Aristotle,
n.d., 1364b)
the possible [is greater] than the impossible; for one is useful in itself, the other not
(Aristotle, n.d., 1365a-1365b)
With these criteria in mind, we can think about how to establish new hierarchies between
values of the same level of importance as a procedure in which someone, in a given situation,
review the conditions of possibility of each of the values pertaining to a set, and try to:
1) Establish which value is a condition of possibility of another value.
2) know the subordination between values where one of them compromises the
execution of the other one
3) Discover which value is a condition for maintaining another value.
4) Understand which value is realizable and which one is not.
This procedure, or some procedure similar to this one, is a way of solving the
incommensurability problem or, at least, this is my suggestion. This approach accomplishes
the work of commensurate values without arbitrarily adding a value in terms of which to
express all the remaining values. Also, this method allows us to commensurate values
I do not think all of the criteria Aristotle presents in Rhetoric for stablishing “the greater good and the more
advantageous” (1363b) are applicable to values from the point of view of their conditions of possibility, but I do
think that some of them are.
2
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without going against the pluralistic assumption. This procedure makes it possible to
commensurate values belonging to different axiological dimensions because axiological
multidimensionality does not imply any performative multidimensionality. Even if we have
different values belonging to different dimensions, all of them are executed by actions, and
there is only one dimension of actions. Therefore, from the point of view of what makes
possible the realization of values, we can commensurate them. Thus, in a given situation, we
can have arguments in which arguers go from considerations about the possibilities of
realizing values to the establishing of hierarchies between them. For example:
Example 1
1.1) Although justice (J) is a value as important as it is peace (P)
1.2) given that in the current situation these values are incompatible with each other,
and given that something must be done
1.3) considering that we should subordinate the smaller to the greater
1.3.1.1) considering that what precedes is the greater when one thing follows from
another, but the relationship is not reciprocal
1.3.1.2) and that peace (P) will make possible a strong state in which justice (J) may be
achieved, and that the seeking justice will make peace impossible.
1.3.2.1) considering also that what is possible is greater than what is impossible
1.3.2.2) and that the state does not have enough power to win the war and impose
justice, but it does have enough power to negotiate and obtain peace.
1.4) We should subordinate justice (J) to peace (P).
Example 2
2.1) Although peace (P) is as important as it is justice (J)
2.2) given that in the current situation they are incompatible with each other, and given
that something must be done
2.3) considering that we should subordinate the smaller to the greater
2.3.1.1) considering that things that last a longer time are greater than those that last a
shorter time
2.3.1.2) and that without justice (J) there is no guaranty of no repetition of the current
war
2.3.2.1) considering also that is greater something whose loss is greater than something
whose loss is not greater
2.3.2.2) and that subordinating justice (J) to peace (P) we would lose not only justice
but also national unity
2.4) we should subordinate peace (P) to justice (J).
What we have here are two examples of two conductive arguments in which:
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(a) There is a recognition to the effect that two values belonging to different dimensions
have the same level of importance.
(b) There is a perception that those values have become incompatible with each other.
(c) And there is a consideration of
(c.a) criteria for stablishing hierarchies from the point of view of the value’s
conditions of possibility and
(c.b) features of a current situation, in which the values have to be executed
(d) Accordingly, a conclusion is drawn in which a new hierarchy of values is
stablished.
Three features of these examples are worth to be remarked: First, (a) and (d) may be
acceptable at the same time, since (a) puts (P) and (J) on the same level of importance, while
(d) puts (P) and (J) on different places of the agenda, according their conditions of
possibility. Second, although (d) express the conclusion of the argument, if, as is expressed in
(a), something must be done, the practical reasoning does not have an end on (d). In (d) is
expressed an on-balance premise needed for other premises of other arguments to be
accepted, until the point in which a decision can be made. In other words, I think this
proposal is coherent with the modular approach to the practical reasoning. And, third, in (d)
there is a disagreement between (1.4) and (2.4), each of these conclusions stablishes a
different subordination between (P) and (J). However, this disagreement may also be
developed asking for the conditions of possibility of values. For example, if it is greater what
last longer and peace without justice does not last enough, is it possible to use a provisional
peace for making a state stronger enough to win the next war, ensure the national unity and
impose justice, if needed? Here we can also have disagreements, but here we do not have the
incommensurability of values problem, we have practical disagreements as usual,
disagreements about what to do in order to achieve some purposes and execute some values.
4 Conclusions
In this paper I have dealt with a particular kind of conductive arguments. That is, conductive
arguments in which two values of the same highest level (1) become incompatible with each
other, (2) belong to different dimensions of a practical problem, (3) cannot be commensurate
in terms of a third value, and (4) are presented as positive and negative considerations with
regard to a proposal.
I have considered previous answers to very similar problems and I have taken
advantage of them to grasp a better understanding of the incommensurability of values
problem. I have reviewed how conductive arguments in which positive and negative
considerations belonging to a same dimension may lead to reasonable conclusions, when the
positive consideration stablishes the exceptional nature of a situation in regard to a rule
expressed in the negative consideration (Govier, 1999, 2010). I have taken note of how
conductive arguments in which positive and negative considerations belong to different
dimensions may lead to reasonable conclusions, by means of analogies from a case pattern,
when there is a singular case pattern (Fischer, 2011). I have learned how premises in which a
descriptive or normative predicate is ascribed based on a family resemblance conductive
reasoning may be justified by assigning preferences to the different criteria from which such
a predicate is ascribed. I have taken advantage of the modular approach to practical
reasoning, and I have understood that conductive arguments may lead to reasonable
conclusions starting by arguments from classifications, when values belong to different
dimensions and a hierarchy of values expressed in an on-balance premise is presupposed
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(Macagno & Walton, 2018). Finally, I have become aware of how conductive arguments may
lead reasonably to conclusions by means of a modus tollens argument, in which a
consequence is appraised as unacceptable because is incoherent with a highest value, when
the highest values are compatible with each other. After considering these accounts, I have
realized that in order to solve the incommensurability of values problem it is necessary to
justify an on-balance premise in which a value is presented as outweighing other value
without detriment to it or compromising it, without introducing a third value in terms of
which commensurate the values in conflict, and without going against the pluralistic
assumption.
I have suggested that an on-balance premise may be justified in the required way by
means of a comparison between the value’s conditions of possibility. Between two values,
the one that is a condition of possibility of the other may outweigh it, without detriment. To
establish which value outweighs the other one we can make use of several criteria. In this
paper, I have not tried to stablish what those criteria are. Instead, I have quoted four criteria
that Aristotle considers in his Rhetoric and that, as I understand them, satisfy what is needed
for my current task. At the end of the paper, I sketched two examples to illustrate my
suggestion. The main supposition of this proposal is that we can maintain axiological
incommensurability and make performative commensurations. If this proposal is acceptable,
conductive arguments in which positive and negative considerations are incommensurable
values may lead to reasonable conclusions by means of factual revisions of value’s conditions
of possibility.
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